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Recent Cases
EQUITY-EQUITABLE CONVERSION BY CONTRACT-RISK OF LOSS
Skelly Oil Company v. Ashmore'
The plaintiff, Skelly Oil Co., entered into a written contract with the defendant
Ashmore for the sale of the latter's realty as a prospective service station site.
The contract price was $20,000. The contract covered "the buildings, driveways,
and all construction equipment thereon." It was plaintiff's intention to raze the
buildings in order to make way for new structures.
After the making of the contract, but before the agreed closing date, the
principal building was destroyed by fire, without fault of either party. There was
no provision in the contract, which had been drawn by Skelly's legal department,
covering risk of loss. The building was covered by fire insurance to the extent of
$10,000, which amount was recovered by the insured (defendant-vendor).
Plaintiff claimed the right to these proceeds by virtue of the contract of sale.2
Defendant disagreed, and refused to deliver the deed under plaintiff's altered
terms. Plaintiff brought suit for specific performance, with an abatement in the
purchase price equal to the amount received by the defendant on the fire insurance
policy. The trial court found for the plaintiff. Vendor appealed. Held: Judgment
for plaintiff-vendee affirmed.
The case raises the question whether, after the execution of a contract of sale
of realty, but before the closing date, a portion of the subject matter is destroyed,
equitable conversion can be said to have shifted the burden of loss to the vendee.
A distinct, but related, question is which party should be the recipient of the
insurance proceeds.
The Rule of Paine v. Meller
As to the first question, Paine v. Meller3 has long been thought to state the
majority American view.4 Under the rule of this case, a conversion of land into
1. 365 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1963).
2. Plaintiff informed defendant he was relying on Standard Oil Co. v. Dye,
223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S.W.2d 946 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929), see note 39 infra.
3. 6 Ves. Jr. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1801).
4. Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., 112 Ala. 108, 20 So. 419 (1895); Roach v.
Richardson, 84 Ark. 37, 104 S.W. 538 (1907); Felt v. Morse, 80 Fla. 154, 85 So. 656
(1920); Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900); Thompson v.
Norton, 14 Ind. 187 (1860); O'Brien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 186 N.W. 440
(1922); Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926); Brewer v. Herbert,
30 Md. 301, 96 Am. Dec. 582 (1869); Skinner & Sons' Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock
Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900); Cetkowski v. Knutson, 163 Minn.
(641)
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money, and money into land, is said to have taken place at the time of the execu-
tion of the contract of sale, the vendee thus being regarded as the equitable owner
of the land and the vendor, equitable owner of the purchase amount.5 Since the
vendee is regarded as equitable owner of the land, a natural consequence of the
doctrine is to place the risk of loss on the vendee, notwithstanding the fact that the
vendor may still be in possession.6
The reason for the rule is often said to rest on the maxim that equity regards
what ought to be done, as done. As with most maxims when used to explain the
result in a complex situation, the attempted application here is open to the
criticism of oversimplification, or a priori reasoning to support a result.
A better explanation would seem to be that equitable conversion is applied
because, in equity, the vendee is regarded as the substantial owner of the land from
the time of the making of the contract.7 The vendor has evidenced his intention to
give up, and the vendee, to take, the land in question. Thus, during the period
between execution and closing, when the abstract of title is being brought up to
492, 204 N.W. 528 (1925); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74 (1921);
Coolidge & Sickler, Inc. v. Regn, 7 N.J. 93, 80 A.2d 554 (1951); Gallicchio v.
Jarzla 18 N.J. Super. 206, 86 A.2d 820 (1952); Re Sermons's Land, 182 N.C. 122,
108 S.E. 497 (1921); Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N.D. 42, 111 N.W. 623 (1907);
Oak Bldg. & Roofing Co. v. Susor, 32 Ohio App. 66, 166 N.E. 908 (1929); Dunn
v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926 (1900); Spratt v. Greenfield, 279 Pa. 437, 124
At. 126 (1924); Brakhage v. Tracy, 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363 (1900); Maudru
v. Humphreys, 83 W. Va. 307, 98 S.E. 259 (1919); Wetzler v. Duffy, "78 Wis. 170,
47 N.W. 184 (1890).
5. To the effect that Paine v. Meller, supra note 3, does not actually stand
for so broad a proposition, see Hermann, The Doctrine of Equitable Conversion: I.
Conversion by Contract, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1962).
Lord Elden, in Paine v. Meller, supra note 3, rejected the dictum of Stent v.
Bailis, 2 P. Wins. 217 (1724), where it was stated: "If I should buy a house, and
before such time as by the articles I am to pay for the same, the house be burnt
down by the casualty of fire, I shall not in equity be bound to pay for the house,
and yet the house may be built up again."
6. This rule has been critized for the reason that, it is said, the vendor in
possession can better protect the premises from harm. This argument fails to note
that if the fire is caused, or allowed to occur, by the negligence of the vendor, the
loss falls on him even under the majority rule.
7. "It seems clear ... that the courts do not base the rule on the doctrine
of equitable conversion. . . . The rule is based on the princple that the contract
gives to the purchaser in fact and substance the real ownership of the land, the
vendor retaining in his own right possession, rents and profits for the brief interval
before performance, and the legal title as security for the purchase money ...
The question must turn on whether the purchaser does become in fact and sub-
stance the dominant owner of the property . . . so that the risk of loss should
fall on him because the dominant ownership is in him." WALSH, EQurry 440 (1930).
But see Keener, The Burden of Loss as an Incident of the Right to the Specifw
Performance of a Contract, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1901): "The phrase equitable
conversion, it is submitted, is a form of speech used to express a result which has
been reached in a certain class of cases in the interest of justice. It does not lead
to, but represents results reached. It is just in a given case that realty should be
treated as if it were personalty, or personalty as if it were realty, and a court of
equity so treats it. The reason why it is just will vary with the facts presented. It
may be because of the intention of the parties or for other reasons."
[Vol. 28
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date, and the details of financing are being worked out, it is reasonable to give
both the benefits and burdens of ownership to the vendee s
An oft heard objection to the application of the majority rule of Paine v.
Meller is that it rests on a "legal fiction." There can be little doubt that equitable
conversion is a fiction, since the land is not really transformed into money, or vice
versa. However, to use this as a criticism of the result reached under Paine v.
Meller seems to indicate a misunderstanding of the doctrine.
Equitable conversion takes place at the time of the execution of the contract.' 0
However, for this conversion ever to be given any legal effect, there must be a
specifically enforceable contract "at the very time when the court is called upon
to perform it."1" Since specific performance is always a discretionary remedy,' 2 a
court of equity can merely refuse to grant it when to do so would cause inequitable
results. Thus, the mere fact we are using a fiction to express the result reached does
not mean that we should ever have an inequitable decision. It is, then, only when
the granting of specific performance would not cause inequitable results, because
of the conversion which is said to have taken place, that the remedy should be
allowed.
Once we have determined, under the doctrine of Paine v. Meller, that the
risk of loss is on the vendee, the question becomes: Who is to receive the proceeds
of a recovery on a fire insurance policy which the vendor had taken out prior to
the execution of the contract of sale? This was the question presented in Rayner
v. Preston,'3 and the court found for the vendor.' 4 The theory of the case was
8. Some of the benefits and burdens to the vendee are listed by Keener,
supra note 7 at 3-4, as follows: "(1) The vendee can call for a conveyance of the
property from a donee or purchaser with notice. (2) The interest of the vendee
can be assigned or devised. (3) In the event of the vendee's death, his heir, not his
personal representative, is entitled to a conveyance. (4) Under a devise by the
vendee of his real estate, the interest of the vendee passes. (5) In jurisdictions
where a wife is given dower in equitable estate, the widow of the vendee is en-
titled to dower. (6) The vendee has the right to require husband-like conduct of
the vendor in the management of the estate. (7) The vendee is chargeable with
the costs of improvements made by the vendor under compulsion of law. (8) The
vendee is chargeable with taxes paid by the vendor beyond the value of the
usufruct. (9) An estate which a vendor has contracted to sell will pass under a
will to a devisee to whom the vendor has devised the estates held in trust by him.
(10) A court of equity will not allow a widow to claim, as against the vendee,
dower in land which the husband had, before his marriage, contracted to sell. (11)
The property is no longer liable for the debts of the vendor."
9. "Some legal writers refer to the so-called English rule as a legal fiction.
It is well named. Legal fictions are the bane of the law. They should not be per-
mitted to propagate in this state." Dissent in McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309,
318, 186 N.W. 74, 78 (1921).
10. 19 AM. JUR. Equitable Conversion § 28 (1939). This point was apparently
overlooked in Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 369,
386 (1913).
11. Stone, id. at 386. Contrast the author's approach on this point.
12. 81 CJ.S. Specific Performance § 9 (1953). See also DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK
OF MODERN EpuITy § 94 (1956).
13. 18 Ch. Div. 1 (1881).
14. The companion case of Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883), held




et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
that a contract of insurance does not run with the land: thus, even though
equitable ownership passes to the vendee at the time of execution of the contract
of sale, no interest in, or right to, the insurance proceeds is so transferred.15
The considerable weight of American authority, however, has adopted the view
of the dissenting judge in Rayner v. Preston.16 He said that the insurance money
was an altered form of the res of which purchaser was equitable owner.,T The rela-
tionship between the parties was said to be that of trustee and cestui que trust' s
The Massachusetts Rule
A strong minority position is that first pronounced by the Massachusetts
court." Courts following this view hold that where buildings on property covered
in the contract of sale are destroyed before the time for performance of the con-
tract, the loss falls on the vendor.2
0
15. "The majority of the court in Rayner v. Preston were sound in principle.
Insurance is a mere personal contract to pay a sum of money by way of indemnity
to protect the interest of the insured. . . . Both in the forum and the market place
it is known that the insurance runs to the individual insured and not with the land.
The vendor has a beneficial interest to protect, i.e., his own .... Plaintiff (vendee)
may not have the insurance money collected by defendant (vendor). It is not a
part of the res bargained for and no trust relation exists in regard to it." Pound,
J., in Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 374, 146 N.E. 630, 632 (1925).
16. 2 CHAFEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON Egun-y 970-71 (1934). The cases are
collected in 64 A.L.R.2d 1402 (1959). The English rule was changed by statute
to provide that the purchaser might claim the insurance money received by the
vendor. 15 Geo. V. c. 20, § 47 (1925).
17. "The money is considered a substitute for the insured property, and is
held by the vendor under precisely the same duties and obligations as he had held
the building. This view seems much more equitable and it is in harmony with the
general principles controlling the majority view (Paine v. Meller) of the main
question, where the vendor is so often treated as trustee for the purchaser." Van-
neman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate
and Transfer of Title, 8 MINN. L. REv. 127, 138 (1924).
18. "The result reached by these English cases (Rayner and Castellain)
seems unwise, unjust, and inequitable. . . . The majority of the courts in this
country avoid such results by means of a theory which is quite consistent with the
view which places the risk of loss on the purchaser. It is submitted that the error
was made in the case of Rayner v. Preston in denying the purchaser a right in the
insurance contract." Vanneman, supra note 17 at 138-39. See also Vance, Vendee's
Claim to Insurance Money Received by Vendor, 34 YALE L.J. 87 (1924); Simpson,
Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II, 44 YALE
L.J. 754 (1935); and, Cribbet, Insurance and the Executory Contract for the Sale
of Real Estate, 51 111. B.J. 124 (1962).
19. Bissonnette v. Keyes, 319 Mass. 134, 64 N.E.2d 926 (1946); Libman v.
Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920); Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79
N.E. 766 (1907); Kares v. Corell, 180 Mass. 206, 62 N.E. 244 (1902); Wells v.
Calnan, 107 Mass. 514, 9 Am. Rep. 65 (1871). Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134
(Mass. 1838), involved an oral contract, unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds; thus, the holding in this case is not inconsistent with Paine v. Meller,
supra. Missouri has reached the same result on similar facts: see Blew v. McClelland,
29 Mo. 304 (1860). However, the later Massachusetts cases used the broad lan-
guage of Thompson v. Gould, supra, to establish the "Massachusetts Rule."
20.'The cases are collected in 27 A.L.R.2d 454 (1953).
[Vol. 28
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The rule is based on contract principles, and it is said that the contract must
be construed as if there were an implied condition that the subject matter be in
existence when the time for performance arrives. 2t If the subject matter has
ceased to exist on 'the closing date, each party is discharged from the contract.22
This rule has been praised by those writers who think it is more equitable to
leave the risk on the vendor until the conveyance.2 3 It is considered the better
position on another ground, i.e., it does away with the problem of determining who
is to get the insurance proceeds. Since the vendor, under the Massachusetts Rule,
retains the risk of loss, he is entitled to the insurance proceeds should such loss
occur.24
Possession as Determining Risk
A third view which has found its way into the law is that of placing the risk
on the party in possession.25 This view was first espoused by Professor Williston,2 0
and the acceptance by several courts of possession as the criterion of risk resulted
in his drafting of the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. 27 This act was
subsequently approved by the Commission on Uniform Laws, 28 and has now been
passed by the legislatures of eight states. 29
Missouri Precedents
The Missouri Courts have long followed the majority rule of Paine v. Meller.30
The first Missouri case, Snyder v. Murdock,-' was an action at law on two promis-
sory notes given for land and fixtures. The fixtures were burned. The court, in giv-
ing judgment for the holder, stated the rule broadly:
21. See Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 At. 205 (1935), citing
RESTATEMENT, CoNMAcrs § 281, which states: "In promises for an agreed ex-
change, a promisor is discharged from the duty of performing his promise if sub-
stantial performance of the return promise is impossible because of the non-
existence, destruction or impairment of the requisite subject-matter of means of
performance. . . " Note, however, comment c.: "After a contract to sell land on
which there is a building, in some states and under some circumstances, the buyer
is held bound to pay the price in spite of the destruction of building. . . . These
cases, however, are not exceptions to the rule stated in the Section, since when
recovery of the price is allowed, the result is based on the premise that the sub-
stantial incidents of ownership had already passed to the buyer before the destruc-
tion."
22. Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. R., 12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544 (1885).
23. Vanneman, supra note 17.
24. Id. at 143.
25. Presumably, the theory is that the one in possession has the burden of
taking due care of the property and guarding against loss by appropriate insurance.
26. Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the
Common Law, 9 HtAv. L. REv. 106, 111-30 (1895).
27. See Simpson, supra note 18; and Comment, 21 So. CAL. L. REV. 177
(1948).
28. 9c U.L.A. 313, 314 (§ 1).
29. These states are: California, Hawaii, Michigan, New York, North Caro-
lina, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
30. See 4 Mo. L. REv. 290 (1939).
31. 51 Mo. 175 (1872).
19631
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After an executory contract for the conveyance of real estate has been
entered into, by the execution of a bond for title and notes for the purchase
money, the property is at the risk of the purchaser.
If it bums up it is his loss, if it increases in value it is his gain. This is
the settled equity doctrine, and is based upon the principle that in equity
what is agreed to be done must be considered done.82
In Walker v. Owen,3 3 the risk was again placed on the vendee. Here, however,
the vendee had gone into possession prior to the building's destruction; and the
fact of possession was emphasized by the court to take an oral contract to convey
out of the Statute of Frauds.
In Manning v. North British and Mercantile Insurance Co.,34 the Kansas City
Court of Appeals held that the execution of a valid written contract transfers an
equitable interest to the vendee. The court rejected the notion that possession in
the vendee is required to perfect equitable ownership.
In Ranck v. Wickwire,3 5 the supreme court seemed to deviate from the theory
of equitable conversion, holding, as the headnote correctly states, "where, before
the submission to defendant of an abstract showing clear title in him and tendering
a deed, things the contract for the exchange of lands required, a valuable dwelling
house on plaintiff's lands burns by accident, while there is no depreciation in the
value of defendant's property, and plaintiff offers nothing by way of reparation,
he cannot have specific performance." The court cited no Missouri cases for this
holding. It is interesting to note that in Mahan v. The Home Insurance Co. of New
York,0 6 the Kansas City Court of Appeals said:
It is the rule in this state that after "a contract for the conveyance of
real estate has been entered into, by the execution of a bond for title and
notes for the purchase money, the property is at the risk of the purchaser.
If it burns up it is his loss, if it increases in value it is his gain." Snyder
v. Murdock. This is the view latter announced by the Supreme Court as
shown in Ranck v. Wickwire, 255 Mo. 42, 61. (Emphasis ours.) s7
This same language was quoted with approval by the supreme court in American
Central Insurance Co. v. Kirby.8
The fact of the matter is that the Ranck case represents a tacit rejection of
the theory of equitable conversion. This, however, is the sole exception to Missouri's
adherence to the majority view, and this view was apparently so ingrained in
Missouri law that the courts have failed to recognize it as a deviation.
Standard Oil Co. v. Dye39 is a case similar on its facts to the principal case.
The plaintiff had exercised an option to purchase realty from defendant. There
32. Id. at 177.
33. 79 Mo. 563 (1883). See also Ingram v. Kiewit, 331 S.W.2d 681 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1960) where vendee was in possession.
34. 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S.W. 1095 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
35. 255 Mo. 42, 164 S.W. 460 (1914).
36. 205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S.W. 593 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
37. Id. at 593.
38. 294 S.W.2d 556, 560 (1956).
39. 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S.W.2d 946 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929).
[Vol. 28
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was a building on the property which plaintiff wished removed, and on which de-
fendant carried insurance. Before closing, the building was destroyed by fire, and
defendant collected the insurance proceeds. In an action by the purchaser to re-
cover the insurance proceeds, the court of appeals, following the dissent in Rayner
v. Preston,40 gave judgment for plaintiff.41
In the instant case, the majority of the court, notwithstanding the precedents
discussed supra, allegedly adopted the Massachusetts rule of Libman v. Levenson.42
The court states:
We do not agree that we should adopt the arbitrary rule of Paine v.
Meller, supra, and Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, supra, that there is equitable
conversion from the time of making a contract for sale and purchase of
land and that the risk of loss from destruction of buildings or other sub-
stantial part of the property is from that moment on the purchaser ...
Instead we believe the Massachusetts rule is the proper rule.... The rea-
son for the Massachusetts rule is that specific performance is based on
what is equitable; and it is not equitable to make a vendee pay the vendor
for something the vendor cannot give him.43
But the Massachusetts rule, as we have seen,4 leaves the risk of loss on the
vendor. Thus, also, the vendor is entitled to the insurance proceeds. The Missouri
court, on the other hand, in purporting to adopt the Massachusetts rule has, in
effect, placed the risk of loss on the vendee, since the vendee was awarded the en-
tire amount of the insurance proceeds in the form of an abatement of the purchase
price.
The court quotes from Libman v. Levenson, saying:
When 'the value of the buildings constitutes a large part of the total
value of the estate . . . the contract is to be construed as subject to the
implied condition that it no longer shall be binding if, before the time for
conveyance to be made, the buildings are destroyed by fire. . . . The con-
tract is no longer binding on either party. . . . If the change in the value
40. Supra, notes 13-18. See also Skinner & Sons' Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co.
v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 AtI. 85 (1900).
41. The dissenting opinion in Skelly states: "... adapting this doctrine
(Paine v. Meller) and following a majority opinion in another English case, Rayner
v. Prestion .... the rule as stated in the Dye case has evolved." (emphasis added)
365 S.W.2d at 592. See also In Re Savings Trust Co. v. Skain, 345 Mo. 46, 53, 131
S.W.2d 566 (1939): "The relation of vendor and purchaser exists as soon as a con-
tract for the sale and purchase of land is entered into. Equity regards the purchaser
as the owner and the vendor as holding the legal title in trust for him. . . . This
equitable principle may be invoked in actions at law .. . and that even though the
purchaser has not been put in possession." (Authorities omitted.) This language
has been approved in: Hamilton v. Linn, 355 Mo. 1178, 1180, 200 S.W.2d 69, 70(1947); Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 134, 182 S.W.2d 86, 110 (1944);
Hernandez v. Prieto, 349 Mo. 658, 661, 162 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1942); State v.
Baumann, 348 Mo. 164, 168, 153 S.W.2d 31, 34 (1941).
42. 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920). See supra, notes 19-24.
43. 365 S.W.2d at 587-89.
44. Supra, note 24.
1963]
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of the estate is not great, or if it appears that the buildings did not con-
stitute so material a part of the estate to be conveyed as to result in an an-
nulling of the contract, specific performance may be decreed, witk compen-
sation for any breach, of agreement, or relief may be given in damages.'
(Court's emphasis) 45
Thus, under this language, a vendor can get specific performance only if the
breach is not substantial. Similarly, because of the mutuality requirement, a vendee
cannot get specific performance if there has been a material breach.
Apparently, then, by awarding the amount of the insurance recovery to the
vendee, the court is saying that the vendor has breached his agreement to the ex-
tent of $10,000; and, yet, this is seemingly not, in the court's view, a substantial
breach. This seems questionable when we consider that the contract price was only
twice this amount.
A further criticism of the case would seem to be that the court has, without
necessity, disregarded the principle of stare decisis. Had the court accepted the
Paine v. Meller approach, it would have reached exactly the same result that it
did, in fact, reach. And, under Standard Oil Co. v. Dye,4 6 the insurance proceeds
would have gone to the vendee.
With this in mind, it seems doubly difficult to justiify this sudden acceptance
of the "Massachusetts Rule." Although the court specifically rejects the Standard
Oil Co. case as acceptable precedent, it fails even to discuss the supreme court
cases which seem clearly contra to the Massachusetts view. We are thus left in
doubt as to whether Snyder v. Murdock, 7 and the line of cases following Snyder,
have been tacitly overruled by the principal case.48
Judge Storckman, dissenting, suggests that the case be decided by a resort to
general principles of equity. As applied here, he concludes that specific performance
should be granted on condition that plaintiff-vendee pay the full $20,000 purchase
amount, less any actual damage that it can show. Thus, he would reach, in this
case, at least, the same result as would the Massachusetts Rule, when properly
applied. As Judge Storckman suggests, whether the insurance proceeds are given
to the vendor, or to the vendee, one party is receiving a windfall of $10,000.O
Thus, possibly a more equitable approach might be to apportion the proceeds
between the two parties. This has been done by Missouri courts in the case of a
45. 365 S.W.2d at 589.
46. Supra, note 38.
47. 51 Mo. 175 (1872). See supra, note 31.
48. A student note on Skelly cites Snyder v. Murdock as having been over-
ruled by the principal case. 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 305, note 2 (1963). But nowhere
in the Skelly opinion does the court so state.
49. "[TIhe problem.., is which of them is to have the advantage of this piece
of good fortune. Skelly contracted to pay $20,000 for the property. If it is awarded
the $10,000 windfall, it will receive a $20,000 lot for $10,000. If the Ashmores re-
tain the $10,000, they will in fact have realized $30,000 for a piece of property
they have agreed to sell for $20,000." 365 S.W.2d at 591.
[Vol. 28
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life tenant and remainderman, 50 and a life tenant and reversioner. r' To so dispose
of the matter would not conflict with the doctrine of Paine v. Meller,5 2 and would




State ex rel. Busk v. Elliot1
A boy nine years of age was allegedly injured, while riding his bicycle, as
the result of a collision with the defendant Bush's car. Suit was filed and inter-
rogatories were submitted to the defendant. One asked for the name of the de-
fendant's liability insurer, and another requested that a copy of the insurance
policy be attached to the answer. Defendant admitted disclosure of his insurer
was proper for the purpose of jury examination, but objected to producing the
policy. This, defendant argued, would reveal the policy limits and would be be-
yond the scope of applicable Missouri discovery rules. 2 The trial judge over-
ruled the objection, and defendant brought prohibition to prevent the trial judge
from requiring disclosure of the policy limits. The Missouri Supreme Court, en
banc, held that discovery of liability insurance policy limits is not available under
the Missouri rules.
In denying the requested discovery, the supreme court relied heavily upon
two propositions. First, the simple test for discovery in Missouri is whether the
information sought "tends to prove an issue in the case"; it is not that the re-
quested information might aid the inquiring party in preparing for trial. The issue
before the trial court was the alleged negligence of the defendant, which his lia-
bility insurance neither tended to prove nor disprove. Second, the court found
the Missouri statutory provisionss for the preservation of the rights of a potential
judgment creditor and for the application of liability insurance proceeds to the
payment of a final judgment to be salutary and adequate for the protection of a
successful plaintiff.
50. Fitterling v. Johnson Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 S.W.2d 347 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1938). Noted, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 575 (1938).
51. Ridge v. The Home Life Ins. Co., 64 Mo. App. 108 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
52. The theory would be that the vendee would receive the proportionate
value of his equitable interest, which he has acquired by equitable conversion; the
vendor would receive the value of his retained legal interest. Admittedly, some
criteria would have to be worked out in order to determine the value of these
interests.
53. This case is also noted in 39 N.D.L. Rev. 351 (1963), and 8 St. Louis U.
L.J. 266 (1963).
1. 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
2. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01, 57.01(b).
3. §§ 379.195-.200, RSMo 1959.
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This was a case of first impression in Missouri, 4 although it has been the sub-
ject of numerous decisions in other jurisdictions. The federal district courts have
considered the question on so many occasions5 that one judge recently concluded
it is now merely a matter of determining the school of thought which one con-
siders to represent the proper interpretation of Federal Rule 26(b).6
The controlling phrases of both the Missouri and the federal rules concern-
ing such discovery are: "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action" and "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible ev-
idence.": The first two federal cases to consider the pertinent language, as amended
in 1948, were Orgel v. McCurdy8 and Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc.,9
both of which permitted the discovery. The Orgel decision found that the inquiry
was "made as to matters generally bearing on the issue," and the court in the
Brackett case believed the tenor and purpose of state legislationo regarding auto-
mobile financial responsibility made such insurance relevant.
The next federal case of McClure v. Boegeri' denied such recovery, and 'the
battle was joined. Since the McClure decision, the issue has been litigated at least
fifteen times12 in the federal district courts 8 with substantially the same argu-
ments. Proponents of such discovery contend it is "relevant to the subject mat-
ter" in light of Rule 1,14 which sets forth the purpose of the rules to be the "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." The purpose of the rules
will thereby be served, because the plaintiff's knowledge of the insured's policy
limits will promote out of court settlements. To the contrary, opponents of dis-
covery reason that every argument to be made in favor of disclosure of liability
4. State ex rel. Cummings v. Witthaus, 219 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. En Bane 1949),
allowed discovery, but is clearly distinguishable because the case also involved a
question of agency, which the insurance policy tended to prove.
5. Federal decisions allowing discovery: Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D. N.J.
1961); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Schwentner v. White,
199 F.Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961); Hurt v. Cooper, 175 F.Supp. 712 (W.D. Ky.
1959); Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951);
Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). Federal decisions denying dis-
covery: Hooker v. Raytheon Co., 31 F.R.D. 120 (S.D. Calif. 1962); Langlois v.
Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962); McDaniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D.
Ohio 1962); Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F.Supp. 476 (D. N.J. 1962); Cooper v.
Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159
(E.D. Tenn. 1962); Flynn v. Williams, 30 F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn. 1958); Gallimore
v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.
Il1. 1958); McNelly v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v.
Boeger, 105 F.Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
6. McDaniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01(b).
8. 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
9. 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
10. The Tennessee insurance law at that time was of the general type requir-
ing proof of financial responsibility upon having an accident.
11. 105 F.Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
12. Cases cited supra note 5.
13. This question has never been decided by a federal appellate court.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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limits can be made in every civil case to furnish the plaintiff with full information
as to the defendant's personal wealth,15 further arguing that compromise settle-
ments are not the aim of the discovery rules.16
The question is a close one and seems open to personal interpretation. Only
four years after the Brackett decision, a different judge on the same court denied
discovery of policy limits.' Although the court attempted to distinguish the cases
on the basis of punitive damages, two subsequent decisions' 8 by the same court
leave no doubt that the Brackett case has been overruled. Even state courts and
the federal courts located within that state do not always agree.' 9 Although it
has never been held that state discovery rules are binding20 on the federal courts
under Erie R. R. v. Thompkins,2' it might be thought that the construction of
the same state financial responsibility laws would result in similar decisions.
Naturally, state court decisions are as varied22 as the federal courts', due to
differently worded rules of discovery.23 South Dakota denies discovery under a
rule which requires the information sought to "constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action."2 4 The California courts have al-
lowed discovery both under their old rules of discovery2 and under their new
rules, which are patterned after the federal rules.26 In allowing discovery, the
15. Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); McClure v. Boeger,
105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
16. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
17. McNelly v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
18. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Hillman v. Penny,
29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
19. California, Illinois and New Jersey. Cases cited supra note 5 and note 24
infra.
20. Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F.Supp. 476 (D. N.J. 1962); Hill v. Greer, 30
F.R.D. 64 (D. N.J. 1961).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22. State decisions allowing discovery: Petie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal.
App.2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1960); Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App.2d
391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235
P.2d 833 (1951); Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959);
People ex rel. Terry v. Fischer, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957); Maddox v.
Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
State decisions denying discovery: DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz.
291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958); McKee v. Walker, 21 Conn. Supp. 168, 149 A.2d 704
(1958); Verrastro v. Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703 (1958); Ruark v.
Smith, 51 Del. 420, 147 A.2d 514 (1959); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla.
1957); Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); State ex rel.
Allen v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); Peters v.
Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957); Bean v. Best, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
23. It should be pointed out that discovery of insurance policies is permitted
when there is a collateral issue in the case, such as agency, which the insurance
does tend to prove or disprove. Such cases are often cited by proponents of dis-
covery but are not true precedents for cases involving only questions of negligence,
which is the sole interest of this note.
24. Bean v. Best, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
25. Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951).
26. Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App.2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1960);
Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App.2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959).
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court relied principally upon § 11580 of the California Insurance Code,27 which it
construed to create a contractual relationship between the insurer and third parties
negligently injured by the insured. 28 Nevada later denied discovery even though its
rules were patterned after California's, because it had no similar provision in its
insurance code.29 Illinois allows discovery under a rule which requires the subject
to be "related to the merits of the matter in litigation."30 In allowing discovery,
the Illinois court expressed the opinion that litigation is a practical matter, and
because the insurer is the real party in interest in such a suit, discovery should
be permitted.
Apparently, the courts do not rely as much upon the precise language of the
discovery rules or statutes in deciding the question as they do upon the basic
issue of whether the plaintiff should be allowed to discover policy limits when
it is clear that the same is not an issue in the case and is only for evaluation and
settlement purposes.3' The number of decisions both allowing and denying dis-
covery give no positive indication of either a majority view or a recent trend to-
ward one position. However, the action of New Jersey in recently amending its
discovery rules32 to expressly provide for discovery of liability limits may supply
a key. Many courts may, in their cases of first impression, deny such discovery
in the belief that if it is warranted, then the rules themselves should explicitly
support such a conclusion.
RAY E. KLINGINSMITH
PROPERTY-TITLE TO STOCK PURCHASED
WITH FUNDS WITHDRAWN FROM JOINT BANK ACCOUNT
Pelsue v. Pelsuel
Husband and Wife, hereafter H and W, opened a bank account entitled "Ed
or Agnes Pelsue." At least part of the funds placed in this account were originally
the separate property of W. Before their marriage H had bought and sold corpo-
rate stocks, and after their marriage H continued to do so, presumably with W's
knowledge. The funds for some of these purchases were withdrawn from, and the
proceeds from some of these sales were placed in, the parties' joint bank account.
Upon the discovery after H's death that the stocks so purchased were in H's in-
dividual name, W claimed that this fact had been unknown to her, and she as-
27. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.
28. Supra note 27.
29. State ex rel. Allen v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d
999 (1952).
30. People ex rel. Terry v. Fischer, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
31. Ruark v. Smith, 51 Del. 420, 147 A.2d 514 (1959).
32. N.J. RULES 4:16-2.
1. 367 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1963). The decision also involves other points not
within the scope of this note.
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serted ownership of the stocks by virtue of their having been purchased with
funds from the joint bank account. H had left a will which evidently was unsatis-
factory to W and she had filed a renunciation, thereby electing to take an undi-
vided one-third interest in H's estate. However, in this action W contended that
these particular corporate stocks were owned by H and W as tenants by the en-
tirety, and therefore that they were not a part of H's estate, but were rather her
sole property, as surviving cotenant. This contention was opposed by the executor
of H's estate, who of course was responsible for the conservation of H's estate,
and by H's two children by a previous marriage, who presumably were benefi-
ciaries under H's will. Held, the entirety interests of H and W continued in the
withdrawals from the joint bank account, and the stocks purchased therewith were,
in equity, owned by H and W as tenants by the entirety, so that W, as survivor,
became the sole owner.
In a situation involving property with multiple owners, there is always an
initial, and frequently perplexing, problem of classifying the legal interests of the
cotenants. However, for present purposes, it will be assumed that the court's
classification of the bank account as constituting a tenancy by the entirety was
correct.2 Rather, the problem to be specifically dealt with is the respective interest
of the cotenants in personal property purchased with funds withdrawn from such
a bank account. And, since the right of survivorship is one of the principal induce-
ments to the creation of a tenancy by the entirety (as well as a joint tenancy),
it is not surprising to discover that most cases on this problem, including the prin-
cipal case, arise upon the death of one of the cotenants.3 The surviving cotenant,
of course, claims that such property is held under the same tenancy as the bank
account and therefore that he is now the sole owner of the property.
In view of the undoubted popularity of bank accounts in the name of two or
more persons, particularly a husband and wife, payable to either or the survivor,
and in view of the legal effect given such accounts in Missouri, 4 it is somewhat
surprising that only a handful of reported cases in this state can be found.
The principal case quotes from two of these Missouri cases.5 Although the
point is not discussed, the rulings in these two cases appear to be basically incon-
sistent on at least one point. The Ambruster case finds a presumption, albeit a
2. On this problem see Evans, Property-Estates by the Entirety in Joint
Bank Account, 8 Mo. L. REV. 213 (1943), and Russell, Cotenancies in Personal
Property, 19 J. Mo. BAR 70 (1963). Concerning the use of or instead of and in the
account name "Ed or Agnes Pelsue," and the apparent failure to include other
words expressing an intention as to the tenancy created, such as "payable to either
or the survivor," see Longacre v. Knowles, 333 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1960), discussed
in Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 417, 417-419 (1960).
3. Of course the question can also appear in other contexts, such as upon a
divorce or a suit by creditors of one spouse.
4. Section 362A70, RSMo 1959, is to the effect that cotenants of such ac-
counts in a bank shall hold as joint tenants. Similar provisions relating to savings
and loan associations and to trust companies are found in §§ 369.150 and 363.740,
RSMo 1959, respectively. Also see § 301.195, RSMo 1959 relating to ownership of
automobiles.
5. Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 28 (1930); Harrellson
v. Burks, 326 S.W.2d 351 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
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weak one, in favor of the proposition that the joint interests of the depositors fol-
low withdrawals and attach to property, consisting in that case of stock certifi-
cates, purchased therewith. On the other hand, the Harreilson case, dealing with
an automobile purchased in the husband's name with funds from a joint bank
account with his wife, espouses the theory that the presumption should be that
a withdrawal destroys the joint interests therein, where the withdrawal is partial
and can reasonably be considered to be one which would be within the contempla-
tion of the other cotenants.
As indicated above, this discrepancy is not discussed, much less resolved, in
the principal case. Practically, however, the point may be relatively unimportant,
since the Ambruster case indicates that the presumption in favor of the joint in-
terests readily yields to proof of the real intentions of both parties. And, these real
intentions may perhaps be implied from the fact that the withdrawal was partial
and was one which could be considered to be within the contemplation of the co-
tenants, thus satisfying the criteria of the Harrellsonr decision.
Clearly, joint interests should not follow withdrawals, where one cotenant ex-
pressly consents to, or acquiesces in, the purchase of property by the other coten-
ant in the latter's sole name.0 But where no such express consent or acquiescence
can be found nor be implied, the principal case indicates that property purchased
with funds from an account held by the entireties will be impressed with the same
ownership interests.
Several other states have tended to follow a rule similar to that of the prin-
cipal case,7 although variations can be observed.8 California has apparently adopted
the same rule as the principal case.9 In fact, the California rule has been described
as "a rule of property that now must be followed."' 0 The New York courts have
had occasion to deal with this type of problem often. Some of the New York de-
cisions seem to apply the rule used in the principal case;" however, other cases
have indicated that the applicability of the rule may depend on whether one co-
tenant withdrew all or only a moiety of the account.'2
6. Harrellson v. Burks, supra note 5; Zahner v. Voelker, 11 S.W.2d 63 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1928).
7. Feltz v. Pavlik, 257 S.W.2d 214 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953), in accord with
the principal case and citing cases in New York, California, Oregon and Pennsyl-
vania.
8. Oregon v. Gralewski's Estate, 176 Ore. 448, 159 P.2d 211 (1945); See
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 71 (1945).
9. See, e.g., In re Harris' Estate, 169 Cal. 725, 147 Pac. 967 (1915); Gold-
berg v. Goldberg, 217 Cal. App. 2d 684, 32 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1963); In re Hoeffin's
Estate, 176 Cal. App. 2d 619, 1 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1960); Young v. Young, 126 Cal.
App. 306, 14 P.2d 580 (1932).
10. Lagar v. Erickson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 365, 56 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1936) (con-
curring opinion).
11. Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929); O'Connor v.
Dunnigan, 158 App. Div. 334, 143 N.Y.Supp. 373 (1913) aflrmed without opinion
213 N.Y. 676, 107 N.E. 1082 (1914).
12. In re Sutter's Estate, 258 N.Y. 104, 179 N.E. 310 (1932); Jackenthal v.
Jackenthal, 258 App. Div. 1074, 139 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1955); In re Leakes' Estate,
163 Misc. 285, 296 N.Y.Supp. 720 (1937).
[Vol. 28
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/10
RECENT CASES
No distinction between withdrawal of more or less than a moiety of the ac-
count is found in the principal case, and it is probably safe to assume that no
such mechanical formula will be used in the Missouri courts in future decisions
on this question. Of course, the amount of the withdrawal, especially in relation
to the total deposit, may be an important factor in determining the existence of
an implied consent on the part of one cotenant for the other to appropriate some
funds for his own use. While the principal case sheds little light on the question
of the weight to be given various factors in determining such consent, the Am-
-bruster case' s indicates that from a common sense view the very fact that each
cotenant is given the right to make withdrawals would seem to imply permission
to make personal appropriations of the funds for certain purposes from time to
time.
Continuing with this common sense view of the matter, it would seem reason-
able to suppose that each cotenant of a bank account in the name of a husband
and wife assumes, and even expects, that the other cotenant will use funds in the
account for necessary personal expenditures, as well as to purchase items for the
family as a unit. With regard to such personal items, "it would seem forced and
unnatural to say that the purchaser becomes a trustee for the other spouse as
to a joint interest in the property."14 But, by the same token, it would seem rea-
sonable to suppose that the cotenants do not contemplate withdrawals for invest-
ment purposes, unless the same interests attach to the new investment as existed
in the bank account.
There is dictum to the effect that such items as a suit of clothes or jewelry
will not be impressed with the same joint interests as existed in the bank account
out of which the items were purchased.l 5 However, it is suggested that this cat-
egorization should not be considered conclusive. The court was apparently at-
tempting to list items of a purely personal nature in which the other spouse would
normally not even consider asserting any interest. But the court might have very
little difficulty in reaching a result similar to that in the principal case in a situa-
tion where one spouse purchases valuable jewelry with funds from a joint bank
account, since such jewelry could easily represent a considerable amount of money
and might have been purchased as something of an investment.
What is the rule in regard to household furniture, books, musical instruments,
or appliances? These items can represent a substantial expenditure, which is often
taken from the spouses' joint bank account. There is apparently no reported au-
thority in Missouri on this precise point, and in view of the statutory provisions
giving the surviving spouse such items absolutely,1e it is likely that no such ques-
tion will be litigated in the future, at least in the context of the principal case.
There is also an apparent lack of reported cases in Missouri concerning the
ownership of various other items of personal property which might be purchased
13. Ambruster v. Ambruster, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 72, 31 S.W.2d at 37.
15. Ambruster v. Ambruster, supra note 5.
16. Section 474.250, RSMo 1959.
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ostensibly in the husband's sole name with funds from a joint bank account. Ob-
vious examples include livestock, farming implements and manufacturing machin-
ery. These, and other similar tangible investments, can easily represent a consider-
able amount of money, and ownership of them could therefore become an impor-
tant matter in a given situation, but in the absence of additional elaboration by
the Missouri courts it is uncertain how such a situation would be resolved.
The rule of the principal case might find some applicability to an automobile
purchased in the name of one spouse with funds taken from the joint bank ac-
count. This point has been mentioned in at least two Missouri cases. In one,' 7 an
automobile was included with a suit of clothes as examples of the type of more
or less personal items which a husband would be expected to buy with funds from
the joint account. But in view of the importance of the automobile to both spouses
in the modern American family, and the somewhat frequent practice of register-
ing the automobile in the names of both spouses, a contention that a "family"
automobile is the "personal" property of the husband may be subject to serious
doubt. In the second Missouri case discussing this point,18 ownership of an auto-
mobile registered in the husband's name but purchased with funds from a joint
bank account, was directly involved, but the court was able to decide the case
without making a definitive ruling on the question of the actual ownership of the
automobile. However, the court did indicate that it might decide, in an appro-
priate case, that both spouses were the actual owners of an automobile so pur-
chased, if it could be shown that the one spouse had purchased the car in his in-
dividual name wrongfully and contrary to the intention of both spouses, and if it
could further be shown that the other spouse had not acquiesced in the purchase.
Therefore, it seems that the present status of Missouri law on this subject is
that joint interests may attach to securities, as in the principal case, or to a new
bank account, in which withdrawals from the joint bank account have been
placed,' 0 or perhaps to an automobile under the conditions outlined above. How-
ever, it should be stressed that there is no indication at the present time that
the Missouri courts intend to let this principle be so extended as to provide a
sort of painless estate planning technique. If the surviving cotenant can be shown
to have consented at the time to the purchase of the property in the other coten-
ant's name, or if the survivor can be shown to have failed to complain about the
transaction after he learns of it, then the joint interests which existed while the
funds were in the bank account will be deemed to have been destroyed.20 The rule
of the principal case seems to be most applicable in situations where one cotenant
has apparently attempted to take unfair advantage of the other, without the lat-
ter's knowledge or consent.
WM. C. MORGAN
17. Ambruster v. Ambruster, .rupra note 5.
18. Harrellson v. Burks, supra note 5.
19. Feltz v. Pavlik, supra note 7.
20. Harrellson v. Burks, supra note 5; Zahner v. Voelker, .pra note 6.
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TORTS-MISSOURI-RIGHT OF WIFE TO RECOVER FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY
Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Ic. 1
Plaintiff Novak averred that her husband, while a passenger in an automobile,
was negligently injured by respondent and as a result she was deprived of his
consortium, including his companionship and conjugal affection, for which she
sought $100,000 as damages. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was sus-
tained on the ground that a wife may not recover for loss of consortium caused
by the negligence of a third party. On appeal, held, reversed. Even though the
wife had no such right under common law, she can now sue for loss of consortium
caused by the negligence of a third party because of the effect of the Married
Women's Act2 on her legal status.
At early common law, the status of a wife was that of a servant of her husband.
Consequently, the husband had an action for loss of services or consortium for
interference with his proprietary right in his wife.3 However, the wife had no action
for loss of consortium.
We may observe, that in these relative injuries notice is only taken of the
wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dis-
solution of either the relation itself, or, at least, the advantages accruing
therefrom; while the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unre-
garded. One reason for which may be this: that the inferior hath no kind
of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the su-
perior is held to have in those of the inferior; and, therefore, the inferior
can suffer no loss or injury 4
The wife's identity was merged into that of her husband. She therefore had no
capacity to maintain an action in her own name. She had no legal standing to
sue.5 Thus, at early common law, the wife was denied both the right and the
remedy for loss of consortium.
The passage of the Married Women's Acts, however, gave the wife an inde-
pendent legal standing. She could, inter alia, hold her real and personal property,
including rights in action, separately from her husband, and she could sue and be
sued in her own name without joining her husband. She was now able to recover
in actions for intentional interference with her marital interests such as criminal
conversation, 6 alienation of affections,7 and the inhibited sale of liquor or narcotic
1. 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
2. §§ 451.250-.300, RSMo 1959.
3. PaOSSER, TORTS 683-84 (2d 6d. 1955).
4. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 143 (8th ed. 1778).
5. PROSSER, TORTS 690-92 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947); Woodman v.
Goodrich, 234 Wis. 5g5, 291 N.W. 768 (1940).
7. Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 28 S.W. 328, (1894); Red Eagle v. Free,
191 Okla. 385, 130 P.2d 308 (1942).
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drugs.8 And the husband, in most jurisdictions, could still recover for any in-
vasion of his marital interests o However, the wife was still denied the right to sue
for a, loss of consortium due to negligence.3.
This denial is based upon the following arguments. The wife's injuries are too
remote and consequential to be capable of measure."1 The wife had no such right
under common law and the Married Women's Acts conferred no new rights, but
merely removed procedural disabilities.12 The purpose of damages in negligence
cases is to compensate the injured person for the direct consequences of the wrong;
and as the injury to the wife is indirect, it is not compensable.13 The material
services are the predominant factor for which compensation is given; and as the
wife has no right to her husband's services, she has no cause of action.' 4 Since
the husband is legally bound to support his wife, he recovers for any impairment
of his ability to perform that duty in his own action and thus the wife recovers
indirectly for her loss of consortium. If she were allowed to sue independently,
therefore, she would gain a double recovery.'5
But in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,"' a 1950 decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the face of the unanimous decisions to the
contrary, held that a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium due to the
negligent injury of her husband. Since that decision, eight states, now including
Missouri, have followed the Hitaffer lead.' 7 Two federal courts have held that the
8. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147, (1940); Moberg v. Scott, 38
S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
9. Furnish v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 102 Mo. 669, 15 S.W. 315 (1891); RE-
STATEMENT, ToRTs § 693 (1938); see Annots., 133 A.L.R. 1156 (1941), 21 A.L.R.
1517 (1922). But see Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 1378 (1952) for cases representing a
minority view denying the right to the husband so as to be consistent with denial
of the wife's right.
10. Bernhart v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918); Gambino v. Manu-
facturer's Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158 S.W. 77 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913);
Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1913); RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 695 (1938); see Annots., 23 A.L.R. 2d 1378
(1952), 59 A.L.R. 680 (1929), 5 A:L.R. 1049 (1920).
11. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Feneff v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co.,
189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
12. Cravens v. Louisville & N.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Nash v.
Mobile & O.R., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928).
13. Howard v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Co-op., 207 P.2d 784 (Okla. 1949);
Kosciolek v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517, 160 Pac. 132 (1916).
14. Boden v. Del Mar Garage. 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
15. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937);
Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y.S. 459 (1900); Pound, Individual In-
terests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Micm'L. REv. 177, 194 (1916).
16. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
17. ARKANSAS. Missouri Pac. Trans. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d
41 (1957).
DELAWARE. Yonner v. Adams, 167 A.2d 717 (Del. Super. 1961).
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laws of two additional states would compel a similar conclusion, although the courts
of those states have as yet voiced no opinion on the question.18
Two concepts have weighed large in the reasoning of these courts: the en-
larged scope of consortium and the effect of the Married Women's Acts on the
wife's legal status. Consonant with the modern view, and indicating the view
which these courts take, consortium has been defined by the Supreme Court of
Missouri as including, "a spouse's society, which, in turn, encompasses the right
to the other's affection and companionship and the conjugal rights of each. . .. !
And the court in the Hitaffer decision has said, "Consortium, although it embraces
within its ambit of meaning the wife's material services, also includes love, affec-
tion, companionship, sexual relations, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic
unity."20 Taking cognizance of the fact that the Married Women's Acts have rec-
ognized the equality of the wife to the husband, these courts have concluded that
if a husband is allowed a right to recover for loss of consortium due to negligent
injury, a wife cannot be denied the same right.
The effect of these conclusions is to reject the arguments used by the majority
of jurisdictions in denying the wife's action. If the injuries to the wife be remote
and consequential, or indirect, then those injuries would bear the same relation
to the husband in his action for loss of consortium from negligent injury of his
wife. Yet he is allowed to recover. Therefore, the wife should be allowed to re-
cover, for her rights are equal to those of her husband and are equally protected
by law. The Married Women's Acts have created in the wife new rights not
previously held. Consortium includes more than material services; it includes
sentimental interests as well. Accordingly, the wife may recover for those senti-
mental interests because they are her separate and direct personal loss. The double
recovery argument of the majority emphasizes only the loss of support element of
consortium. But the wife is suing, not merely for loss of support, but for other
elements of consortium which are not compensable in the husband's action. The
possibility of double recovery, therefore, may easily be avoided by allowing com-
pensation for only those elements of the wife's loss which have not been recovered
by the husband in his action.21
ILLINOIS. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
IowA. Acuff v. Schmidt, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956).
MICHIGAN. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
MISSOURI. Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., supra note 1.
SOUTH DAKOTA. Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959).
18. Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961);
Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953).
19. Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., supra note 1, at 543.
20. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra note 16, at 814.
21. Cases cited note 17 supra. Bur see, on the issue of double damages, the
dissenting opinion in Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., supra note 1, at 548
where it is said, "The judge who is able to avoid double damages by 'accurately
delineating' the items that the husband has recovered or will recover in another
action in another court, and correctly instruct the jury on the items of damages
properly recoverable in this case will indeed need the wisdom of a Solomon, not
to mention the utter confusion of the juries."
1963]
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Of these arguments, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in the Novak case, has
emphasized the effect of the Married Women's Act on the status of the married
woman and the method of determining damages so as to prevent double recovery.
The effect of this decision is to protect a right not previously recognized in Mis-
souri by allowing a wife to sue for loss of consortium due to her spouse's negligent
injury. The Missouri cases espousing the previously existing Missouri law on this
subject22 have been directly overruled.2 3 It would seem, further, that this is but
one decision in a relatively new trend in the law.
Louis JERRY WEBER
LIBEL PER QUOD: SPECIAL DAMAGES IN MISSOURI
Langworthly v. Pulitzer Publishing Com/pany'
Plaintiff Langworthy brought an action for libel against defendant publishing
company based on an article published in defendant's newspaper. The article,
appearing under the caption, "'Towhead Pete's' Gang of 5 Boys, 4 Girls Seized,"
related that plaintiff, an attorney, had reported to the police that three pieces of
Swiss cheese, a piece of cake, some jello and twenty dollars had been taken from
his home and that he wanted something done about it. The article further stated
that a group of nine children ranging in ages from two to thirteen years old had
been rounded up by the police and that they had admitted entering the house,
but they insisted that they had found only twenty-eight cents rather than twenty
dollars. The article reported that the children, other than the two year old, had
been lectured by the police and juvenile authorities, but that the two year old,
who was in diapers, was released because the police "couldn't pin anything on
him, anyway."
Plaintiff charged that certain portions of the article were false and that the
acts which he had reported to the police included a long series of intrusions, in-
cluding several acts of larceny and vandalism. Plaintiff pleaded that the article
meant, was intended to mean, and was understood by those to whom it was pub-
lished to mean, that he had falsely reported the amount of money stolen and was
therefore untruthful, and for that reason it could be inferred that he was not well
suited for his professional duties as an attorney, and that he was a selfish and
egocentric person who enlarged the importance of a trivial wrong committed
against hirri by small children in demanding police action against those committing
the action, to an extent that he was ridiculous. No special damages were pleaded.
Held: the article was not libelous per se and without special damages being
pleaded, no action for libel per quod could be maintained.
22. Bernhart v. Perry; Gambino v. Manufacturer's Coal & Coke Co.; Stout
v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., supra note 10.
23. Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., supra note 1, at 542, 545.
1. 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963).
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Since the Langwortky case2 the supreme court has again stated in Otto v.
Kansas City Star Co.3 and in Hellensen v. Knaus Truck Lines& that in order to
state a claim for which relief could be granted for libel per quod, special damages
must be pleaded. The Langwortky case has been cited as authority in both of
these later decisions.
A distinction between the law of slander and the law of libel has long been
recognized. Libel has been considered a more serious offense than slander. The
distinction seems to have arisen because libel comes from defamation embodied
in a physical form, whereas slander does not.5 Oral defamation comes to an end
when it falls on the ear of the person to whom it is spoken and is left only to the
hearer's memory, whereas libel remains in existence and breeds a new crop of
defamatory harms every time that it is seen.5 The harm that libel threatens is
therefore of a greater range and duration than is the harm threatened by slander.
It has been thought that libel possibly evidences a greater malice on the part of
the publisher than does slander, since libel is deliberately reduced to a permanent
and distinct physical form.7
There are two different types of libel: libel per see and libel per quod. Libel
per see exists where the defamatory imputations are clear upon the face of the
publication, whereas in libel per quod the defamatory imputations arise only by
reference to extrinsic facts known by the reader. s Until comparatively modem
times special damages did not need to be pleaded in order to maintain an action
for either libel per se or for libel per quod.9 The Restatement of Torts 0 sustain this
position and it is still followed in some jurisdictions."1 However, the modem
American trend appears to treat libel per quod as slander is treated, thereby re-
quiring special damages to be pleaded and proven in order to state a cause of
action for which relief can be granted.12
Early libel cases in Missouri used language broad enough possibly to have
allowed an action of libel per quod to be maintained without the pleading and
proof of special damages. In 1847, the Missouri Supreme Court seemed to recognize
that there was only one dividing line in the law of defamation-whether that
defamation was oral or whether it was of a permanent form. If it was oral, one
2. Ibid.
3. 368 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1963).
4. 370 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1963).
5. PROSSER, TORTS 585 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 189 Mo. 378, 88 S.W. 60 (1905).
7. Ibid.
8. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 840 (1960).
9. Prosser, ToRTs, supra note 5, at 587.
10. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569 (1934).
11. ". . . [A~nd it is not necessary to the right to maintain an action for a
publication not libelous per se to allege or prove special damages." Gibler v.
Houston Post Co., 310 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
12. Furlong v. German Press Ass'n., 189 S.W. 385 (Mo. En Banc 1916);
Nordlund v. Consolidated Elec. Co-op., 289 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1956); also see 53
C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 170(c) (1948); 33 AM. JUR. Libel and Slander § 243
(1941); Prosser, Libel Per Quod, supra note 8.
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set of rules was applicable; if it was of a permanent form, another was applicable.
This is exemplified in Nelson v. Musgrave13 where the court said that "the rule
which prevails in relation to oral slander is not applicable to actions of libel."
In 1876 the St. Louis Court of Appeals inferred that the pleading and proof
requirement pertaining to damages for libel per quod and libel per see were the
same. "If, in such covert meaning, an injurious effect is implied, the offense of
libel is as complete as if it were apparent in the common acceptance of the
words employed."'4 Hence, one might conclude that if libel per se was actionable
without pleading and proving special damages, libel per quod was also actionable
without pleading and proving special damages.
The exact issue of damages was touched upon in Sptrlock v. Lombard In-
vestment Co.'s There the court held that if an alleged libel contained anything
from which the law would infer damages as being necessarily occasioned from its
publication, then that alleged libel was actionable per se. Since a libel could arise
just as easily from words defamatory only in light of certain extrinsic facts as from
words defamatory on their face,16 it would seem to follow that the law would infer
damages as being necessarily occasioned from one as readily as from the other.
This would indicate that all libel was per se in regard to damages, i.e., all libel was
actionable per se regardless of whether it was defamatory per se or defamatory per
quod.
Other Missouri cases have failed to maintain this demarcation between the
law of slander and the law of libel. They have tended to merge the law of slander
and the law of libel per quod insofar as damages are concerned. This tendency is
noticeable in Eby v. Wilson,17 one of the precedents relied upon in the Langworthy
case. 8 The Eby case was an action for libel, but in its decision the court relied on
both libel'0 and slander 20 cases as precedents. Language in the slander cases was
relied upon as precedent for requiring that extrinsic facts be proved to show
special damages in order for recovery to be had in an action for libel per quod.
The court went so far as to distinguish libel per se and libel per quod only by the
necessity to plead and prove special damages to recover in the latter but not
in the former:
Courts and writers of text books have divided defamatory words into
two classes: Those which are said to be libelous per se, for which general
damages may be recovered, and those designated as libelous per quod,
and on account of which special damages only are recoverable, and then
only because alleged and proved.21
13. 10 Mo. 648 (1847).
14. Brennan v. Tracy, 2 Mo. App. 540 (St. L. Ct. App. 1876).
15. 59 Mo. App. 225 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
16. Brennan v. Tracy, supra note 14.
17. 315 Mo. 1214, 289 S.W. 639 (1926).
18. Supra note 1.
19. Mitchell v. Bradstreet, 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358 (1893).
20. Noenger v. Vogt, 88 Mo. 589 (1886); Rammel v. Otis, 60 Mo. 365 (1875).
21. Supra note 17.
[Vol. 28
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/10
RECENT CASES
A further indication of an intermingling of the law of slander and the law of
libel in Missouri can be found in Creekmore v. Runnels.22 The case there before
the court was an action for both libel and slander. The court discussed the need
of special damages to maintain the cause of action without distinguishing be-
tween libel and slander.
Thus, the law of libel and the law of slander may have effected somewhat
the merger in Missouri, at least insomuch as to require the pleading and proof
of special damages in order to recover for libel per quod.23
There is impressive authority to the effect that this is a prevalent trend
throughout the United States.24 This trend has gone so far as to lead to specula-
tion as to what change would result should the Restatement of Torts be rewritten
today.25 However, there would seem to remain a question as to the soundness of
the logic behind this trend. Since libel does have permanence of form, since it
may indicate a greater evil mindedness on the part of the publisher than does
slander, should not all libel continue to be treated as a more serious offense than
slander and thereby require only an allegation of general damages in order to be
actionable? The mere fact that some libel is defamatory only in light of extrinsic
facts would not seem to detract from the lingering harmfulness which is threatened
by that libel's permanence of form.
JOHN E. PARRISH
TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY?
Greeman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.1
Plaintiff's wife purchased a power tool from a retailer for her husband. Two
years later he bought the necessary attachments to use it as a lathe for turning
22. 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949).
23. Some suggestion of a further merger of the law of libel and the law of
slander can be found in Eby v. Wilson, supra note 17. The court said that language
either written or spoken of another and his affairs which caused him pecuniary
loss could be divided into two classes: that which necessarily occasions damages
and that which does not necessarily but by a natural and proximate consequence
occasions damages. This would seem to suggest that all defamation might be
treated alike in the future without regard to whether it is spoken or reduced to
a permanent form.
The court had previously hinted that this result might be reached. In Boogher
v. Knapp, 76 Mo. 457 (1882), language was used in discussing libel which seem-
ingly was more appropriate to slander than to libel. The court said:
If defendants falsely charged and published in writing that plaintiff had
been convicted of libel and his punishment assessed at imprisonment, this
is actionable without any allegation of special damages.
24. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, supra note 8.
25. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, supra note 8, at 850.
1. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). See also, the discussion of this
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a large piece of wood into a chalice. After he had worked on the wood several
times without difficulty, it suddenly flew out of the machine and struck him on
the forehead, inflicting serious injury. About ten and a half months later, he gave
the retailer and the manufacturer written notice of claimed breaches of warranty
and filed a complaint against them alleging such breaches, with an additional
count of negligence.
The court submitted to the jury the cause of action alleging breach of implied
warranty against the retailer and the causes of action alleging negligence and
breach of express warranty against the manufacturer. Plaintiff recovered from the
manufacturer, but not the retailer; both the plaintiff and the manufacturer ap-
pealed.
The manufacturer contended that the plaintiff had not given a notice of
breach of warranty within a reasonable time and therefore his cause of action
for such breach was barred by section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act.2
Justice Traynor, author of the opinion, dismissed this contention on two
grounds. Initially, as between the buyer and seller this is a sound commercial
rule, but when applied to notice to a remote seller (manufacturer) in a personal
injury case, it becomes a boobytrap for the unwary. The second basis was that to
impose strict liability on the manufacturer in this situation, it is not necessary to
establish an express warranty as defined in section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act;8
"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a de-
fect that causes injury to a human being."4
This quotation, while not absolutely necessary to the decision, is an alterna-
tive ground supporting the decision. Since manufacturer's liability in this case is
strict liability in tort, it must be governed by the law in that area and not by
rules defining and governing warranties, unless those rules serve the purpose for
which strict liability is imposed. Thus, in Justice Traynor's opinion, to require
a buyer to give notice of breach of warranty to a remote seller is surely a subver-
sion of the purposes for which strict liability in tort has been imposed. There-
fore, the cry of dictum is without support when we note the well settled rule
2. UNIFORM SALES ACr § 49: "In the absence of express or implied agree-
ment of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the
seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy for breach of any promise or
warranty in the contract to sell or sale. But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the
buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach,
the seller shall not be liable therefor."
3. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 12: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the
seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such
affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the
goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only
shall be construed as a warranty."
4. Greeman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., supra note 1, at 900.
5. 15 STAN. L. REv. 381, 388. (1963).
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that, "where two independent reasons are given for a decision, neither one is to
be considered mere dictum." 6
How did Justice Traynor reach the conclusion that the manufacturer's liabil-
ity is strict liability in tort? Is this determination correct?
The concept of warranty is indeed a strange one. Warranty has been referred
to as a word that illustrates the fault of the common law in the ambiguous use
of terms, 7 and cited as a notable example of legal miscegenation. 'Warranty,"
while originally a tort concept, slowly became limited in its use to direct trans-
actions between the parties. The divorce of warranty from deceit, its origin in
tort, was completed about the beginning of the nineteenth century and the ex-
istence of a cause of action founded upon breach of warranty become identified
with the existence of a contract between the parties. The modem concept of war-
ranty, while identified with the existence of contract, retains through court inter-
pretation many elements of its birth in the area of torts.9
This obvious miscegenation has caused many limitations, inconsistencies, dis-
advantages and complications in expanding the law in this area to meet the pub-
lic policy demands of our time. If the "warranty" cause of action is truly a con-
tract remedy, only slightly colored by its birth in the tort area, and not strict
liability in tort, it would seem the cases requiring a contract between the par-
ties'0 are correct. Under this view, recovery of damages should be limited to those
within the purview of breach of contract;-' there should be a necessity for an
agreement between the parties,12 and the liability should be subject to a disclaimer
by the seller.' 3
Justice Traynor in concluding that these contract limitations are no longer
a part of the changing law in this area analyzed the present situation as follows.
Strict liability was first recognized in the case of unwholesome food products, 4
and then extended to other areas including a grinding wheel,',' bottle,'6 vaccine,'T in-
6. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 2d 644,
650, 20 P.2d 940, 942 (1933).
7. WILLISTON, CoTRACrs § 673 (rev. ed. 1938).
8. 42 HARv. L. REv. 414 (1928-29).
9. PRossER, TORTS § 86 (2d ed. 1955).
10. 2 HARPER & JAMEs, § 28.16 (1956).
11. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331 (5th Cir. 1919); Sterling
Aluminum Prod. Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1944); Whiteley v.
Webb's City, 55 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1951); Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N. H. 365, 189
Atl. 865 (1937); Goodwin v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 361, 42 So.2d 397 (1949).
12. 27 MINN. L. REv. 123, 124 (1942-43).
13. Prosser, Strict Liabilty to the Consumer, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1131-1133
(1960).
14. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135
Pac. 633 (1913).
15. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal.2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d
575 (1960).
16. Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App.2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1961); Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App.2d 198, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 311 (1961).
17. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Lab., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
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sect spray,' surgical pin,' automobile,20 skirt,21 home permanent, 22 hair dye,23 auto-
mobile tire,24 and an airplane.2 These cases while finding liability on the theory
of an express or implied warranty, abandoned the traditional contract limitations,
thus making it clear that liability is governed by the law of strict liability in tort.
In Peterson v. Lamb26 an employee was injured by a defective grinding wheel and
the court found privity between the employee and seller, even though in fact no
privity existed. This result was reached because of the natural assumption that
employees are going to use products purchased by their employers. This decision
was followed in two later cases involving an employee injured by an exploding bot-
tle,27 and thus for all practical purposes the long standing requirement of privity
was abandoned in California. However, Justice Traynor did not stop there as he
cited cases applying the law of Pennsylvania,2 1 Hawaii,29 Kansas,30 Ohio,31 and
New Jersey 32 which had abandoned the privity requirement either outright or by
rather fictitious reasoning.
The Greeman opinion points out that other strict warranty limitations had
been abolished. The necessity for an agreement between the parties has been abol-
ished in some jurisdictions-a where it is held that the manufacturer's obligation
is one imposed by law, and some jurisdictions refuse to permit the manufacturer
to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products.34 Leading the
way in this area is the often cited Henningsen case35 which denied the effective-
ness of a disclaimer and abandoned the requirement of privity between the plain-
tiff and manufacturer, both on the impetus of public policy. One other contract
limitation which has been abandoned in many states was not mentioned, yet the
recognition of the fact that a suit can be based on an implied warranty for wrong-
18. McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960).
19. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
20. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E. D. Pa. 1961).
21. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1960).
22. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d
181 (1958).
23. Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
24. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
25. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
26. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., supra note 15, at 581.
27. Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., supra note 16; Jones v. Borger-
meister Brewing Corp., supra note 16.
28. McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., sispra note 18; Thompson v. Reed-
man, supra note 20.
29. Brown v. Chapman, supra note 21.
30. Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., supra note 23; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Ham-
mond, supra note 24.
31. Rogers v. Toni Home Perm. Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
32. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
33. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942).
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ful death further strengthens an already strong line of reasoning36 Thus, we see
that, in accordance with the growing trend of the law, Justice Traynor's conclu-
sions were reasonable when he stated the manufacturer's liability is no longer to
be governed by the law of contract warranties, but should be governed by the
laws of strict liability in tort.3
7
Much has been said about the necessity of redefining the manufacturer's liabil-
ity, so as to make him essentially an insurer of his products. Some of the more
notable arguments that have been advanced are as follows: (1) Since the dealer
serves as no more than a conduit in imposing liability on the manufacturer, we
should dispense with this circuitous route and allow the injured person to sue
directly38 (2) The use of warranty to achieve social justice serves as an ob-
stacle rather than a useful tool.3 9 (3) The manufacturer who is reaping the profit
should be made to bear the loss, and can do this by insuring the product or him-
self against the loss. 4 (4) Since the McPherson case res ipsa loquitur has been
used with a great deal of success in imposing strict liability, thus the courts have
accepted the idea of liability without fault, so why not do it openly.41 Whether or
not these arguments are individually persuasive, taken together they present a
strong argument for the imposition of strict liability in tort.
A rule of law similar to that pronounced by the California Supreme Court is
set out in the Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft #7.42 It applies to anyone
engaged in the business of selling food for human consumption or other products
for intimate bodily use and is imposed regardless of fault or privity. This trend
toward strict liability for injury caused by a defective product, has been con-
fused as a result of the courts' attempt to shroud the change in less than lucid
36. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, supra note 24; Hinton v. Republic Avia-
tion Corp., supra note 25; Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557
(1938); Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1920).
37. Greeman v. Yuba Products Co., supra note 1, at 901.
38. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-468, 150 P.2d 436,
441-442 (1944); Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties In the
Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 416 (1930-31); Roberts, Implied Warranties-
The Privity Ride and Strict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L.REv. 194,
208 (1962).
39. 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1573; Roberts, op. cit. supra
note 38, at 204; RESTATEMENT (Second), TORTS § 402A, explanatory notes comment
m at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
40. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra note 38, at 440-441; Roberts,
op. cit. s-upra note 38, at 206-208.
41. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra note 38, at 441.
42. RESTATEMENT (Second), ToRTS, op. cit. supra 39, at 1: "One engaged in
the business of selling food for human consumption or other products for intimate
bodily use, who sells such a product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the consumer, is subject liability for bodily harm thereby caused to one
who consumes it, even though
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of the product, and
(b) The consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
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language. However, now for the first time in a majority opinion, we find a clear
evaluation of the present situation.- We find the same progress in other states
which culminated in the present decision in California. As a result of this careful
evaluation, the trend as noted by the Restatement submission, and the analogous
development of the privity requirement in a negligence action, this author is led to
believe that strict liability in tort is imminent in the area of products liability.
Missouri law in this area had also rejected some of the traditional contract
limitations, but had not progressed as far as many of the noted cases.4 3 However,
in November 1963, Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corporation" was decided by the
Missouri Supreme Court. Now, for the first time we have a fairly clear opinion out-
lining the law in Missouri. This case involved a situation analogous to the one in
Greeman v. Yuba Products Company. It seems to this author, that the Missouri
Supreme Court has, with this case, liberalized its rules in connection with prod-
ucts liability. This case presented the question of "whether a manufacturer of an
instrumentality which is imminently dangerous if defectively manfactured is to
be held to strict liability upon proof of the defect and causation." The court in a
unanimous opinion answered this question in the affirmative. It seems that this
decision opens the way to use of strict liability in almost every case involving in-
jury by a product defectively manufactured. It seems quite logical to say that
under this holding, products may be classed as imminently dangerous merely by
reason of their defective manufacture. If the courts take this approach, it seems
that the impact and breadth of the decision is as great as the holding in the
Greeman case. Even if the courts refuse to accept this interpretation, it can surely
be said the supreme court has extended strict liability far beyond the impact of
prior Missouri decisions and has left the door open for a truly pragmatic approach
to each case.
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43. Anderson, Observations on the Law of Implied Warranty of Quality in
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44. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
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